Identity formation is a prolonged process and influenced by a number of factors. The authors attempts to outline a typology of possible identity trajectories of the Russian diaspora and discusses a number of influence factors which are deemed important to the identity formation. These factors work very differently in the various non-Russian successor states, and it is therefore no reason to believe that all Russians living outside the Russian Federation will develop the same identity. There is, however, good reason to expect that in the final outcome a very large number of them will develop an identity which sets them apart from the Russian core group. 
Introduction
Like any other identity, ethnic identity is a malleable quality (Keyes 1982; de Vos and Romanucci-Ross 1982). The speed, direction, depth, and extension of this change will depend upon a number of factors. These factors may be cultural, for instance exposure to new ethnic groups through migration, or result from changes in the economic structure of society (industrialization, etc.) (Gellner 1983 ).
Post-Soviet society is characterized by rapid and deep changes all across the board, political, economic, and cultural. The reified world of 'Soviet reality' (sovetskaia deistvitel'nost') has collapsed as a deck of cards. This event affects most aspects of the identity of the former Soviet citizens -political, ideological, religious, ethnic, etc. This article will focus on two aspects of identity development, political and ethnic: which state and which ethnic culture will become the foci of identity? In order to keep these two identity axes terminologically apart, I will employ the terms 'loyalty' for the political axis and 'selfunderstanding' for the cultural axis. Both loyalty and selfunderstanding are intended as synonyms for identity.
The identity crisis affects the ethnic groups of the former USSR to different degrees. Two groups are hit particularly hard: politically, the Russians (as the former dominant nation of a defunct state), and culturally, the various diaspora groups, since the unitary Soviet state is today being replaced by nationalizing states in which they stick out as cultural anomalies. The twentyfive million Russians living outside the Russian Federation, 'the new Russian diaspora', straddle both these categories, and might be said to have received the blow of the post-Soviet identity crisis two-fold. This group is the subject of this article.
Due to their high numbers, their habitat in territories which in the Soviet system were deemed to be in some sense the 'property' of other major ethnic groups (the titular nations of the non-Russian Union republics), and the fact that groups develop an especially strong sense of attachment to their nation.
According to a generally accepted theory, national identity is to a large degree acquired through a 'We-They' contrast. As the core group is less frequently confronted with 'them', it also has a less distinct identity as being 'us' (Allworth 1980, pp. 306-7). Raymond Pearson, for one, has unequivocally stated that '"border dwellers" are more sensitive about national identity and loyalty through day-to-day proximity to the state frontier, develop firmer commitments through awareness of the alternatives and are most subject to neuroses about territorial adjustments and therefore national security' (Pearson 1983, p. 20) . Pearson goes one step beyond Kory by claiming that in the periphery national identity is not only not altered or loosened, but strengthened.
Whether for lack of empirical fuel or for lack of methodological clarity, the Western debate on the Russian diaspora identity in the late 1970s petered out, or rather: never really took off. Today, I believe, it is high time to resurrect it. After the breakup of the Soviet unitary state some of its methodological problems will be easier to come to terms with. As a new political map has been superimposed on the demographic map of the former Soviet Union, the line between the core and the diaspora has become drawn as with a scalpel. In the political sense at least it is now possible to claim that Russians living on one side of a state border belong to the core group, while their ethnic brethren a stone's throw away on the other side belong to the diaspora. Although this new political arrangement may not immediately be reflected on the mental level, it is reasonable to suspect that in the long run it will significantly affect the selfunderstanding of the people involved.
The new political map affects not only the methodology of the research, but also its urgency. In 1978 the distinction between a Russian core group and a diaspora group was a purely analytical tool in an academic discussion and concerned scholars only. Today, this is a question of immediate relevance for policy makers as well. If the diaspora Russians in, say, Latvia should come to see themselves as 'Latvians of Russian extraction' this will affect the political discourse and political stability in the region quite differently than if they should consider themselves as 'Russians who happen to be living in Latvia' (Aasland 1994a).
In the 1970s and '80s some Western research was conducted on the topic of 'comparative diasporas' (Sheffer 1986). However, very few of its insights are applicable to the study of the Russian minority communities in the former Soviet republics since 'diasporas' in this research were defined as migrant communities far removed from their homelands rather than as stranded groups of contracted My present contribution to this debate will not be in the form of any largescale sociological survey, but is much more modest. First, I will present a list of possible identities for the Russian diaspora. Second, I will consider some of the more important factors which might be expected to influence the formation and change of identity among diaspora Russians. Third, I will venture some conjectures about possible identity trajectories in the various regions of the former Soviet Union by applying the identity types and influence factors laid out in part I and part II. Finally, some material evidence in support of my hypotheses will be adduced. This evidence will be gleaned from opinion polls conducted by other researchers as well as from interviews of diaspora leaders which I have made myself.
There is of course no reason to believe that all members of 'the new Russian diaspora' will act and react in a uniform manner. On the contrary, the very term 'the Russian diaspora' may be highly problematic since the definite mode, singular, obfuscates the magnitude of the differences within the group. We should be on the look-out for varieties within the diaspora just as much as for patterns of regularities. Within the framework of an article the pictures of the various diaspora communities will inevitably be drawn with a broad brush. For more details and nuances I refer the reader to my book on the subject (Kolstoe 1995).
Any attempt to forecast the identity trajectories of the Russian diaspora in the various regions of the former Soviet Union will necessarily be somewhat speculative. Identity formation is a protracted process, spanning decades and generations. One should be very cautious about mechanical extrapolation of present day trends into the future. From other parts of the world we know that third generation immigrants often reject the cultural preferences of their parents and sometimes consciously attempt to recapture parts of their grandparents' identity (rediscover their 'roots'). Also, since man is not a socially programmable machine, many individual case stories will no doubt differ significantly from probability calculated outcomes. Russians with a sense of being dissimilar to the Russian core group will more easily accept the post-Soviet political arrangement than will Russians with a selfunderstanding indistinguishable from the core group. The former will tend to develop an 'integrating new diaspora' identity.
II Identity types of post-imperial diasporas

CULTURAL OPTION (C). ADOPTION OF THE DOMINANT CULTURE OF THE NATIONALIZING STATE OF RESIDENCE.
(C3) Assimilation. In most cases adoption of the dominant culture of the state of residence will mean inculturization into the titular nationality, this is:
assimilation. Usually change of mother tongue will be the most important ingredient in an assimilation process. Assimilated diasporians will not only learn the language of the titular nationality, but, within a generation or so, they will forget their former mother tongue.
To the extent that Russians will be assimilated into the titular group, they may continue to have a hazy memory of the distant origin of their forebears, but for all practical purposes they will shed their identity as being ethnic Russians.
Their identity situation will be comparable to the situation of most European immigrant groups in the USA, whose only links to their cultural past may be a quaint surname and a dusted photo-collection somewhere in the attic. Most
Russians in the United States, as well as in Western Europe, belong to this category.
II Factors influencing identity formation
The identity choices of the diaspora Russians will be strongly influenced by a number of circumstances. Some of them affect the entire group within a given area, while some vary from individual to individual within the community. The most important of them, as I see it, are enumerated below. The list is offered not as a stringent set of independent variables, the specific weight of which can be measured statistically and from which the identity type of the different diaspora groups can be deduced. Rather it should be seen as a heuristic check list which we ought to have in the back of our mind when we turn to the empirical evidence.
(1) Geographic distance to Russia. If the external homeland is just across the border, the identity links between it and the diaspora are less likely to be severed than in the cases when it is far away. In the latter case it is more reasonable to expect that the local diaspora groups will develop an identity of its own or adopt the local culture. (3) Numbers and compactness. The larger the Russian community is within a given area, the greater is the chance that it will hang on to a distinct identity.
Small diaspora groups are 'endanger species'. However, if small groups are sufficiently compact, they might still be able to withstand assimilation.
Conversely, if a diaspora group is scattered over vast areas and lives intermingled with other ethnic groups it will more easily adopt its basic characteristics, including language. See table 3 ). However, 'fluency' was poorly defined by the Soviet census authorities, and probably cover a wide variety of proficiency levels (Guboglo 1992; Kozlov and Kozlov 1994).
In many of the new nationalizing states the language laws and the requirements for proficiency in the native language is the main issue in the confrontations between the titular nation and the minorities. In most cases when the distinction between speakers and non-speakers of the state language is very much stressed in the political debate this will reinforce the contrast between the indigenous population and the outsiders. (9) The presence of elites among the local Russians. I expect that diaspora groups with weak elite structures will be less able to articulate common interests and sustain a common identity than are groups possessing elites able to take leadership roles in the ethnic community. begin to leave, this will stimulate integration among those who stay behind, for two reasons. The emigrants will usually be the ones who are least willing or able to adapt, and secondly, after their departure the remaining diaspora community will become smaller (Susokolov 1992).
However, limited and large-scale out-migration will affect the structure of the diaspora communities differently. Well-educated elites will more easily find new jobs elsewhere than will people with little formal education. Medium size pullfactor migration therefore will tend to create diaspora groups with many Indians and few chieftains, less able to sustain a distinct identity. 9 Large-scale pushfactor migration which takes on the character of mass flight, on the other hand, will leave behind a socially more diversified diaspora community.
The flows of Russian outmigration to the non-Russian regions of the USSR peaked in the late 1950s and were reversed in the 1970s. Declining birthrates among Russians meant that they no longer had any population surplus to export. Along the cultural axis, Russians in Ukraine tend to feel both attached to and removed from the Russian core group. 12 As pointed out by Andrei Malgin at the Simferopol Regional museum, this ambivalence is shared also by other Russian groups in the periphery of the Russian ethnographical space, such as the Sibirians, and may be interpreted as a case of general Russian regionalism. Russians in the north, and tension between the two major ethnic groups seems to be mounting. Irredentism remains an identity option in the northern provinces.
III Probable identity developments, region-wise.
In southern Kazakhstan the Russians are fewer in number and more cut off from mainland Russia. This leads us to assume that Russian identity formation in northern and southern Kazakhstan will follow very different trajectories. In the north it will remain basically geared towards Russia, politically as well as culturally, while the south will see some outmigration and a growing willingness to adopt and integrate (but not assimilate) among those who choose to stay.
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Concluding remarks.
On the political loyalty axis there has been considerable movement in the There is no reason to believe that the final outcome of the identity formation of the Russian communities in the Soviet successor states will be the creation of one, single diaspora identity. Not only the cohesion within the Russian ethnos at large -between the core and the periphery -is being weakened. This is true also of the cohesion within the diaspora itself. The social, political, economic, and cultural conditions under which the diaspora is living differ greatly. Rather than one diaspora identity we should expect the formation of several new identity types.
